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AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE AND THE UNIQUE
ROLE OF THE LIGGETT GROUPt
Paul Caminititt
Let me first say I am here as a spokesman for Liggett. We are
very pleased that Barbara Colombo put this symposium together
and encouraged us to attend. I am personally very honored to be
on a very distinguished panel of which I am probably the least dis-
tinguished member. I am going to provide a quick overview of why
Liggett chose to settle these lawsuits and how we reached that deci-
sion.
First, Liggett Group is owned by the Brooke Group, Ltd.,
which is a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. Brooke Group also has other interests including real es-
tate and an investment banking and brokerage house in New York.
Liggett is the fifth largest cigarette manufacturer in the United
States, but we are the fifth largest by a long shot; we have less than a
two-percent market share, behind Philip Morris, RJR, Brown & Wil-
liamson, and Lorillard. Seventy percent of our sales come from
discount cigarettes, and our premium brands-L&M, Lark, Ches-
terfield, and Eve-are small regional players. Liggett is the operat-
ing successor of Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., which was formed in
1873. Brooke Group, which is chaired by Bennett LeBow, who has
had a relatively high profile in all this, bought Liggett in 1986. Lig-
gett has five hundred employees.
With that backdrop, let me talk about Liggett's settlements.
t This essay is based on a speech Paul Caminiti gave at William Mitchell
College of Law's Center for Health Law & Policy symposium titled, "Tobacco
Regulation: The Convergence of Law, Medicine & Public Health."
tt Paul Caminiti is a vice president of Sard Verbinnen & Co., Inc., a corpo-
rate financial public relations firm based in New York City. Mr. Caminiti has pro-
vided communications counsel to Brooke Group since 1995 and helped coordi-
nate the announcement of Brooke's landmark tobacco settlements in 1996, 1997
and 1998. Mr. Caminiti holds aJ.D. degree from Fordham University School of
Law (1992), and a B.A. in history from Princeton University (1989).
1. Since Mr. Caminiti made this presentation in September, 1998, Brooke
Group and Liggett's settlement status has changed. On November 20, 1998, the
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Liggett, right now, has binding settlement contracts with forty-one
states, which account for approximately eighty-five percent of the
nation's Medicaid claims. In exchange for the protection that the
settlements afford Liggett, Liggett has agreed to pay up to thirty
percent of its pre-tax income for the next twenty-five years, as well
as certain lump sum payments, to each state on an annual basis.
We have also settled tobacco cases with class action plaintiffs
and certain individual plaintiffs. In the contexts of those settle-
ments, we have acknowledged that smoking is addictive and causes23
cancer. We have put a warning label on our cigarettes. Our
brands are the only cigarettes in this country that say smoking is
addictive.4 We have disclosed the ingredients in our cigarettes.5
We have agreed to Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") juris-
diction and have agreed to severe advertising and marketing re-
6strictions. Perhaps most importantly, we have waived our attorney-
client and work-product privileges and disclosed our internal
documents in the states where lawsuits are proceeding. No other
company has done these things. Our CEO, Bennett LeBow, as well
as other Liggett executives, have testified against the industry
around the country.
To understand why Liggett decided to settle, you have to try to
approach the issue from Liggett's point of view. Since 1954, Lig-
Company announced that Brooke and Liggett agreed to join the Master Settle-
ment Agreement ("MSA") reached between the attorneys general and the tobacco
industry. Under terms of the MSA, Brooke and Liggett have no payment obliga-
tion to the signing states as long as Liggett does not exceed a national market
share of 1.67% (approximately eight billion units/400 million packs). In the
event that Liggett exceeds 1.67% market share, Liggett will pay for the portion
above 1.67% according to the formula set out in the MSA.
Prior to joining the MSA, Brooke and Liggett had reached their own settlement
agreements with attorneys general representing 41 states, accounting for 85% of
the nation's Medicaid claims. The terms of Liggett's prior settlement agreements
no longer apply, except with respect to Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi and Texas,
the four states that have separate settlement agreements with Liggett and the rest
of the tobacco industry and are not signatories of the MSA.
2. See David Phelps, A Tobacco Company Settles; Cigarette-Maker Concedes: Smok-
ing is a Cause of Cancer, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 21, 1997, at IA.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Under Massachusetts Law, Liggett Discloses Cigarette Ingredients; It was the
First Company to Comply, Even Though an Injunction Delayed Enforcement, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 16, 1997, at 15A.
6. See Milo Geyelin, Lonely Lawyers for Liggett Feel Minnesota Chill, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 6, 1998, at B1.
7. See Phelps, supra note 2, at IA.
[Vol. 25
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gett and the other major tobacco companies were united in de-
fending these lawsuits. For years, Liggett, as the smallest company,
played along with the other companies and participated in what
was really considered a scorched-earth litigation strategy, which
was: win every lawsuit; defend every case as vehemently as you can;
do not give an inch or they will take a mile.
Until 1995, the cigarette companies had lost only one case,
which was reversed on appeal, and not a penny was paid in dam-
ages.9 You can understand why the tobacco companies, from a
purely business point of view, were going with this approach.
Other tobacco companies told us, from the time we took over the
company in 1986, that there was really nothing to worry about-
that we had great defenses because of the warning labels and,
basically, that these lawsuits were the "Third Wave of tobacco
litigation,"10 and that these too shall pass.
Liggett began to consider settling in the changing landscape of
the early 1990s. There were several things happening in the 1990s
that influenced our decision. Plaintiff's lawyers were bringing ma-
jor class action lawsuits across the country. Probably the best
known of those was the Castano class action." The Castano plaintiffs
sought a tremendous amount of damages, not to mention punitive
damages.'
2
In addition, people were revising the legal theories under
which they were suing the tobacco companies. They were no
longer simply saying, "You did not tell us about the health effects of
smoking," to which the industry would say, "We have a warning la-
bel that warns you it is not good for you." Instead, plaintiffs started
to argue, "But you never told us that we would get hooked on it.
You never told us it was addictive. You never told us that if we
smoked two packs we will be smoking for the next twenty years."
8. See Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minne-
sota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 480-87 (1999) (detailing the
tobacco industry's litigation strategy for the past four decades).
9. See Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So.2d 1289, 1292-93 (Miss.
1995) (affirming award of zero damages in case where cigarette manufacturer was
found liable for causing the plaintiffs injury).
10. See Ciresi et al., supra note 8, at nn.7-50 and accompanying text (recap-
ping the First and Second Waves of tobacco litigation and detailing the Third
Wave).
11. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 560 (E.D. La.
1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (involving attempt at class action certifica-
tion of action against tobacco companies).
12. See Castano, 160 F.R.D at 548.
1999]
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However, the most influential factor was probably the state
cases. The suits by Mississippi and Minnesota, among others, sent
shivers down the spines of a lot of the companies. These suits ex-
posed the industry to huge liabilities-it was no longer just an indi-
vidual suing for four hundred thousand dollars.
Also, the industry was starting to get some of the worst public-
ity of its day, not that it ever had good publicity. The FDA was try-
ing to assert jurisdiction. The industry was being vilified, culminat-
ing at the 1996 Democratic National Convention, where tobacco
use was a major theme. Al Gore, the son of a tobacco farmer, gave
an anti-tobacco speech.' I think there was a feeling in the tobacco
industry, at least at Liggett, that things were caving in.
There are three major reasons why Liggett settled. The first
was really an economic consideration. As the smallest company,
Liggett could not afford to lose, for example, the case in Minne-
sota. To appeal a one billion or two billion-dollar verdict for what-
ever would have been our pro rata share, Liggett would have had to
post a bond. Liggett could not have done that. We were faced with
the harsh reality that we would have been out of business overnight
if we lost one of these cases. Despite the fact that our peers were
telling us these cases were not a problem, Mr. LeBow, a savvy busi-
nessman, felt differently.
The second major reason is that in 1995 the law firm that had
been representing Liggett for a number years, predating LeBow's
ownership of the company, was disbanded. Those lawyers wanted
to go to another law firm in New York. They asked for our permis-
sion, as we were a huge client of theirs providing probably eighty to
ninety percent of their business. We said to them, "We would pre-
fer if you went with this other law firm in New York, Kasowitz, Ben-
son, Torres and Friedman," who did a lot of other work for Lig-
gett's parent company, Brooke Group. In addition, the Kasowitz
firm specializes in product liability. It made sense to us to consoli-
date our legal representation. Liggett felt it would have a little
more control over the litigation, which quite frankly it did not feel
it had at the old law firm.
Their response was, "Let us think about it." Then they came to
us and said, "We have a proposal for you. If you let us go to the law
13. See Eric Black, Covering the Coverage; If the Networks Were to Halt Live Cover-
age, Well, Life Would Go On, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug. 30, 1996, at
25A (describing the media's reaction to Vice President Al Gore's speech regarding
his sister's death from smoking-related lung cancer).
[Vol. 25
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firm we want, Philip Morris will pay your legal fees." Liggett's legal
fees were running between eight to twelve million dollars a year,
which for Liggett was a major expense. Obviously, this seemed very
odd to us. Our competitor was going to not only take control of
our litigation, but pay our fees. 4 Being businessmen, and not want-
ing to look a gift-horse in the mouth, we said we would accept it in
the near term. But at that point, we started to reconsider our litiga-
tion strategy.
The third major reason was that at this time Brooke Group was
engaged in a proxy fight with investors on Wall Street to separate
RJR Nabisco's food business from its tobacco business. This was
something that a lot of people on Wall Street were calling for in
mid-1995 . There was a lot of sup?ort for it in the investment
community and the financial press. RJR's stock had been lan-
guishing ever since the takeover in the late 1980s,"s and everyone
saw this as an easy way to unlock the real value. Plus, it was a way to
isolate RJR's tobacco business from its food business and get Na-
bisco out from under the cloud of tobacco litigation.
Then RJR told the investment community that it could not
separate RJR and Nabisco because of the outstanding legal liabil-
ity.19 They were afraid that it would look like a fraudulent convey-
ance if the parent company took the assets of the food company
and put it beyond the reach of creditors. This, I think, sent a shock
wave through Wall Street because people felt, "My God; RJR To-
bacco could not handle to pay if they were ever found liable. They
14. See Little Money, Lot of Symbolism in Liggett Tobacco Settlement; Proposal Itself
States that it is Favorable to Company, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 24,
1997, at lIA (stating that of the $9.6 million of attorney's fees spent by Liggett in
1996 defending against tobacco suits, an undisclosed portion of that money actu-
ally came from other tobacco producers).
15. See Elizabeth Lesly, Will Joe Camel Have to Hoof it Alone , Bus. WK., Aug. 30,
1993, at 58
16. See Linda Sandier, RJR Nabisco's Bond-Swap Plan Sparks Anger Among Holders
Who Feel Unequally Treated, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1995, at C2 (stating that proposed
split of RJR Nabisco was "seen as heralding an eventual splitting-up of the com-
pany into totally separate food and tobacco concerns.").
17. See id.
18. See Gene G. Marcial, RJR Starts Sending Up Smoke Signals, Bus. WK, Apr. 12,
1993, at 84 (stating that RJR Nabisco stock fell from $13.00 a share in early 1991 to
$73/ a share in early 1993).
19. See Elizabeth Lesly & Gail DeGeorge, Why is a Lawyer Running RJR Na-
bisco?, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1995, at 38 (quoting RJR Nabisco officials as supporting a
complete spin-off of the company's food business but stating that it cannot do so
until certain commitments to debt holders and "other issues" are resolved).
1999]
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would need to dip into the assets of Nabisco." That really made
Liggett start to reconsider its approach.
The confluence of all these factors caused Liggett to think that
there were some serious legal and ethical issues that we should ad-
dress. We spoke to the Kasowitz firm-Mark Kasowitz and his part-
ner, Dan Benson-and asked them to initiate discussions with the
other side. We did not tell our then general counsel. We did not
tell our litigation lawyers. Mr. LeBow is a very sensible person, and
he said, "Let's see if we can strike a deal."
What we found out is that in more than forty years, this was the
first time that a tobacco company had ever spoken to the other
side, which just astounded us. We also found out that the two sides
were not that far apart, at least with respect to Liggett, so we were
able to very quickly put together a settlement with five of the six or
seven states that were suing at the time. In March 1996, we an-
nounced that settlement-Liggett I. 20 It signified the first break in
tobacco's wall.2
Once we settled, our outside attorneys asked our previous at-
torneys for all the Liggett documents. For the next several months,
our lawyers went through those documents, most of them dating
back twenty, thirty, forty years, into the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Our new lawyers were astounded. They were shocked. They ex-
pressed concern that there was evidence of fraud, conspiracy, and
possibly criminal activity. These were, in short, extremely damag-
ing documents.
At this point, the company decided that it wanted to make a
clean break from the rest of the industry. We believed it was ethi-
cally and financially the right thing to do. We entered into talks
with the additional states that were suing the industry. This led to
our March, 1997 settlement, which Minnesota Attorney General
Humphrey referred to, 2 where we totally broke ranks with the rest
20. See Milo Geyelin, Liggett, Five States Set Pact Covering Treatment of Smoking-
Related Illnesses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1996, at A3 (announcing a settlement deal of
$41 million payable over 25 years made between Liggett and Florida, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Louisiana).
21. See Saundra Torry, Plaintiffs Think They See a Crack in Tobacco's Armor,
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1996, at F7 ("The Liggett settlements may pressure other
companies to soften their fight-at-all-costs stance ....").
22. See Hubert H. "Skip" Humphrey, III, The Decision to Reject the June, 1997




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/3
AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
of the industry.23 We agreed to release our internal documents to
various courts.24 We waived our privileges. 5 We admitted that
26nicotine is addictive and causes cancer. I cannot stress that
enough because no other company had admitted, or has admitted,
that nicotine is addictive. That is the crux of a lot of the new law-
suits, and it was a huge development. We also agreed to FDA regu-
lation. 2' Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, we agreed to make
all efforts to ensure there was no marketing to children under
eighteen. 8
About two weeks after the March, 1997 settlement, Big To-
bacco was at the table in Washington trying to negotiate a global
deal. I think they had explored it with Mississippi Attorney General
Michael Moore after our original settlements, but it was not until
they saw that Liggett was "turning state's evidence" and turning
over documents that they took decisive action. The documents re-
ferred to "The Committee of Counsel" and all sorts of joint meet-
ings where litigation strategy and health concerns were discussed
with the other companies.
Since the March, 1997 settlement we have continued to
broaden our settlements. We have entered into an agreement with
the Justice Department by which we are cooperating with their in-
vestigation of the tobacco industry.s We have been lobbying Con-
gress to ensure that if there is going to be any sort of global settle-
ment, our settlements with the forty-one states will be honored.
In conclusion, let me just say that Liggett's CEO, Bennett Le-
Bow, has said that if cigarette companies are really not going to
market to children, we will all be out of business in twenty-five
years.' Liggett is prepared to accept that fate.
23. See Phelps, supra note 2, at IA (describing Liggett's settlement and




27. See Geyelin, supra note 6, at B1.
28. See id.
29. See David Phelps, Tobacco Industry Might Have to Turn Over Internal Docu-
ments, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 11, 1997, at 10A ("'The Committee
of Counsel' [is] a group composed of attorneys from all the major tobacco com-
panies who conferred regularly on strategy and tactics.").
30. See Ann Davis, Big Tobacco Turns to Criminal Bar for Help on Attorney-Client
Brief, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1998, at B7.
31. See Master Recommends Tobacco Papers Be Admissible in Minnesota Case, Dow
Jones Online News, Feb. 10, 1998, available in WL, MNNEWS File (stating LeBow
expects Liggett "to be out of business in 20 or 30 years").
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